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Abstract
This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding be-
havior under different bid announcement policies. In equilibrium, the auctioneer’s an-
nouncement policy has two distinct effects. First, announcement entices players to signal
information to their post-auction competitors through their bids. Second, announcement
can lead to greater bidder participation in certain instances while limiting participation
in others. Specifically, the participation effect works against the signalling effect, thus
reducing the impact of signalling found in other papers. Revenue, efficiency, and surplus
implications of various announcement policies are examined.
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1 Introduction
Auctions are often a precursor to market competition. Examples include auctions of timber
tracts, oil leases, and PCS spectrum rights and the corresponding lumber, petroleum, and
telecommunications markets.1 In these situations, a number of authors have pointed out
that information contained in bids can be used in subsequent competition, should those bids
be announced. For instance, Rothkopf et al. (1990) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
(1991) argue that third parties may be able to use bid information to extract surplus from the
winning bidder. They point out that surplus extraction is only possible if the winner’s bid is
available, thus helping explain why so many English auctions are often observed while there
are relatively few second price auctions. However, only recently has auction theory considered
that bidders may try to alter their bids to manipulate the information therein contained.
This paper examines the link between post-auction competition and bids at auction with an
eye towards how announcements affect bids, bidder participation, revenues, and post-auction
welfare.
The actual “commodity” being auctioned can take on a number of interpretations. Most
simply, it may be the right to participate in a post-auction duopoly with an incumbent
monopoly (i.e. only the winner of the auction moves on to the post-auction game). For
example, entrant firms bid for the right to compete against incumbent firms in the recent
Turkish spectrum auctions. Alternatively, it could be viewed as in Das Varma (2003) where it
is access to a process innovation that enhances the winner’s competitive position in the post-
auction market (i.e. all bidders move on, but only the winner obtains the innovation). No
matter what the interpretation, bids are based on their expectation of post-auction payoffs,
conditional on a bidder’s private type c.2 When the auctioneer announces some subset β of
all bids submitted, the winner’s post-auction profits will depend on rival beliefs concerning
the winner’s type, G(β), which are based on the auctioneer’s announcement. In general, this
implies a payoff function of π(G(β), c) in the post-auction game for the winner. Since bids are
based on post-auction profits, and these profits depend on the auctioneer’s announcement, it
1See Baldwin et al. (1997), Hendricks and Porter (1988), and Cramton et al. (1997) respectively for
discussions concerning auctions of these commodities.
2We interpret a bidder’s type as a marginal cost draw. For example, when bidding on a product innovation,
the draw represents the bidder’s new marginal cost if they win the auction. In all of our applications a higher
type is worse than a lower type.
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follows that the auctioneer can influence bidding through its choice of which bids to announce.
We show that the impact of the auctioneer’s announcement can be broken down into sep-
arate bid signalling and bidder participation effects. This differs from Goeree (2003) and Das
Varma(2003) who also identify a signalling effect,3 but do not endogenize bidder participation
and extends Goeree (2003) to the case where bidder beliefs are positively related to post-
auction profits. Like their papers, we show that bid signalling stems from the fact that in a
pure strategy separating equilibrium, bids are a monotone function of a bidder’s private type.
Thus, an announcement of a one’s bid is tantamount to announcing their type. Realizing
that their type can be inferred from their bid, bidders will try to manipulate the information
conveyed to post-auction rivals by skewing their bids. Hence, the auctioneer can elicit (or
nullify) the signalling effect by announcing (or not announcing) the winner’s bid. On the
other hand, the participation effect results from imposing individual rationality on potential
bidders. That is, of all bidders eligible to compete in an auction, only those with non-negative
expected payoffs in the post-auction game will submit bids. For a given announcement policy,
the cut-off type bidder (just indifferent between entering and not entering the auction) expects
zero profit in the post-auction game. The fact that different announcement policies impart
different information structures on the post-auction game leads to distinctly different cut-off
types and, hence; varied levels of competition at auction.
The specific impacts of bid signalling and bidder participation on auction revenues depend
on the relation between profits and rival beliefs in the post-auction game. When profits and
beliefs are positively related (π1(G(β), c) > 0), bidders earn higher profits if they can convey
a weaker type than they are in actuality.4 Thus, when signalling is possible, systematically
lower bids are submitted than if signalling is not possible. The result is a negative effect on
revenues relative to a policy of not announcing the winner’s bid. When profits and beliefs
are inversely related (π1(G(β), c) < 0), the effect is opposite and announcing the winner’s
bid is revenue enhancing. In fact, for certain distributions of type (see Section 2: Condition
1), the temptation to under-bid is so strong that bids are degenerately low and a separating
3It should be pointed out that a number of other authors have examined the possibility of bid signalling and
highlighted the fact that it may help explain revenue dominance of one type of auction over another. They
include Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000), Haile (2001, 2003), Laffont and Tirole (1988), and Ortega-Reichert
(1968).
4Of course in equilibrium, types can be inferred by inverting bids and post-auction competitors are not
deceived by the skewing of bids.
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equilibrium in monotone bid strategies ceases to exist. This phenomenon is similar to that
derived by Jehiel and Moldavanu (1995a, 1995b) in bargaining models where externalities exist
between bidder valuations and Haile (2003) where resale is possible following the auction.
Adding to the findings of Goeree (2003) and Das Varma (2003), we show that the revenue
enhancing policies based on the signalling effect are counteracted by the participation effect.
When π1(G(β), c) < 0 (π1(G(β), c) > 0), fewer types participate in the auction when the
winner’s bid is (is not) announced. Intuitively, when the winning bidder is of the cut-off type
and their bid is not announced, rival firms infer that the winner’s type is better (e.g. lower
marginal cost) than it actually is. If it is more desirable that the rival believes that the winner
has a low type (as when π1(G(β), c) < 0) it follows that more types will participate when the
winner’s bid is not announced. If it is more desirable that rivals believe that the winner has
a high type (as when π1(G(β), c) > 0), fewer types participate under a policy of announcing
the winner’s bid. Clearly, lower levels of competition an the auction result in less expected
revenue.
Thus far we have focused on policies of announcing or not announcing the winner’s bid,
independent of the specific auction form used. Fortunately, the number of auction forms
requiring examination is greatly simplified by noticing that Myerson’s (1981) seminal work
on revenue equivalent auctions can be extended to any auction where the seller’s expected
revenue is wholly determined by the allocation, the expected payoff of the worst type bidder,
and the information released by the auction. That is, any auctions satisfying Myerson’s
original conditions will generate identical expected revenues only when followed by the same
announcement policy. For example, if the auctioneer releases the highest of all bids, then
the second price and English auctions will generate different expected revenue. However, if
the auctioneer only announces the price paid then the second price and English auction will
generate the same expected revenue. Because of this, we can restrict focus to two policies, one
in which the winner’s bid is announced, the other in which the winner’s bid is not announced,
but the second highest bid is.5 Since the actual auction form is irrelevant, we restrict attention
to the commonly studied first price, second price, and English (button) auctions.
The main difference between first and second price auctions and an English auction lies in
5Of course, there are policies that release other bid information. However, in our model, the winner’s type
is the information relevant in the post-auction game, thus the highest bid announced provides a sufficient
statistic for the winner’s type and announcement of all lower bids is superfluous.
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the amount of information collected during the auction process. Since bidding in our English
(button) auction stops when the second to last bidder drops out, the winner’s maximum bid
is not observed. The auctioneer thereby limits the information available for announcement
by holding an English auction. Clearly, when the auctioneer wishes to take advantage of the
signalling effect by announcing the winner’s bid, this makes English auctions sub-optimal.
When a policy of not announcing the winner’s bid is optimal, the Revenue Equivalence The-
orem tells us that by withholding the winner’s bid, the auctioneer earns the same expected
revenue using first and second price auctions as they do using English auctions. However,
we point out that English auctions have the added benefit that they give the auctioneer a
way of credibly committing to the non-announcement policy.6 Thus, providing yet another
explanation of why so many English auctions and so few second price auctions are observed
in the real world.
The conflicting impacts of the signalling and participation effects combined with the two-
stage nature of our model limit general revenue comparisons. Instead, we offer a comparison
to the standard IPV case presented in Jehiel, et al. (1996) where nature reveals all private
information after the auction, but before the post-auction competition. Since nature reveals
the winner’s type, there is no link between the auctioneer’s announcement and post-auction
profits and attempts to signal are fruitless. Also, since the winner’s type is known with
certainty in the post-auction game, the cut-off type bidder will be the same regardless of the
auction form used. We show that the benchmark model consistently over- (under-) estimates
expected revenue relative to the cases where π1(G(β), c) > 0 (π1(G(β), c) < 0).
We believe that the case where π1(G(β), c) > 0 provides interesting insight into the
overwhelming success of the recent PCS bandwidth auctions. Since the market for mobile
telecommunications is best characterized by pricing competition, imagine that competitors
in the auction are bidding for the right to enter into a post-auction Bertrand duopoly with
an incumbent monopolist. The nature of Bertrand competition dictates that the incumbent
will set a higher price if they believe that the entrant has a relatively high marginal cost.
Hence, bids will be less aggressive if the winning bid will be announced in an effort to signal
that the bidder expects low post-auction profits because of a high marginal cost draw. The
6Even a non-strategic auctioneer may operate in an environment where credible commitment to a policy
is not guaranteed. Such a case exists in auctions held by the U.S. government where results may be subject
to Freedom of Information Act petitions.
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auctioneer may want to nullify signalling by not announcing the winner’s bid, especially if
it is anticipated that the participation effect will be relatively small.7 Although an English
auction format was chosen because of winner’s curse concerns (see McMillan (1994)), a nice
by-product of that choice was the assurance to bidders that the winners’ bids would not be
announced.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model and a regularity
condition. Section 3 presents Bertrand and Cournot examples (corresponding to the cases
of π1(G(β), c) > 0 and π1(G(β), c) < 0 respectively) that will be used to convey intuition
throughout the paper. Bidding behavior based on a general second stage profit function is
derived in Section 4. Section 5 provides revenue rankings and returns to the specific cases of
Bertrand and Cournot competition to examine the impact of various announcement policies
on welfare. Conclusions are offered in Section 6 and all proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The Model
Stage one of the game considers a set of firms, N (i = 1, ..., n), competing in an auction, the
results of which impact a second stage game. Entering the auction, each firm has expected
payoffΠ(xi, ci) for the entire game where ci is its type and xi is the type reported at the auction.
The specific form of this profit function depends on the auctioneer’s bid announcement policy
and the equilibrium payoff function in the post-auction game. Types are drawn independently
from a C2 function F (c), c ∈ [c, c] with corresponding density f(c). We interpret types as
marginal cost draws, therefore; a higher type is less desirable. c is set so that those who
draw a relatively high marginal cost choose not to participate in the auction, thus; allowing
us to endogenize participation in the auction by identifying the cut-off type firm that is just
indifferent between placing and not placing a bid. The firm with that cut-off type in auction
form a (= 1st, 2nd,Eng) is denoted c∗a.
The auctioneer’s credible bid announcement policy will affect the bidder’s post-market
profit in that it reveals private information to post-auction competitors. Of the set of bids
submitted, B, the auctioneer announces some subset, β, before the second stage game begins.
We focus on instances where the auctioneer announces either the first or second highest bid.
7As discussed above, the participation effect tends to offset this maneuver. However, competition in the
PCS auctions was strong and the impact of relatively fewer weak typed firms participating was likely minimal.
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Following the bid announcement, the winning bidder’s post-auction competitors update their
beliefs concerning the winner’s type, giving an expectation of that type, G(β). The winning
bidder’s second stage profits, π(G(β), c), depend on this expectation, as well as, their true
type c.8
The first partial derivatives of π(G(β), c) are assumed to be monotonic in each argument.
Both announcement policies are compared to the benchmark (BM) IPV case that results
from assuming that nature reveals the winner’s true type, independent of the information
revealed by the auctioneer. In that case, G(β) = c in all situations which is equivalent to
maintaining π1(G(β), c) = 0. When nature does not reveal the winner’s true type, the sign of
π1(G(β), c) dictates the relation between rival beliefs and the winner’s post-auction profits.
The marginal cost interpretation of type indicates that π2(G(β), c) < 0. It is further assumed
that the second partial derivatives π11(G(β), c), π22(G(β), c), and π12(G(β), c) exist and are
continuous. Finally, the following regularity condition ensures existence of equilibrium in all
of the auction forms considered.
Condition 1.
π2(x, c)
π12(x, c)
<
[1− F (x)]
(n− 1)f(x) , ∀x, c ∈ [c, c
∗].
Remark. This regularity condition ensures that the tendency to under-report types at auction
is not so great as to produce degenerately low (zero) bids. When π12(x, c) < 0, the condition
is satisfied for all distribution functions. However, when π12(x, c) > 0, it may be violated for
certain distribution functions. Condition 1 is similar to that found in Das Varma (2003) but
differs in two respects. First, higher types are better in his model but worse in ours; thus,
changing the interpretation of the sign of π2(x, c). Second, our condition allows for any finite
number of bidders, producing his result when the number of bidders is restricted to two. In
addition, Condition 1 nests Goeree’s restriction that π12(x, c) > 0 and therefore allows us to
consider a larger class of profit functions. For example, his assumption precludes Bertrand
competition in the post-auction since π12(x, c) < 0 in that case.
8It is important to note that the assumed form of the dependence of profits on beliefs is fairly restrictive.
However, it does not affect our equilibrium bidding results and is necessary for obtaining tractable solutions
for comparing auction revenues and subsequent post-auction market welfare.
7
Special Issue I (Auctions) APPLIED ECONOMICS RESEARCH BULLETIN March 2008
AERB Special Issue I http://berkeleymath.com/BerkeleyJournal.aspx 59
3 Stage Two: Post-Auction Competition
Since backward induction is used to derive the equilibrium of the entire game, we begin by
examining the second stage. In our general examination of the auctions, we simply assume
that the second stage game has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium and that the profits in that
game, π(G(β), c), possess the properties discussed in Section 3. For the remainder of the
paper we assume that firms losing the auction receive zero profit in the post-auction market.
In order to assess the impact of various announcements on this post-auction market we
must first determine how the set of possible participants in the post-auction market is impacted
by the announcement policy. The following theorem is driven by the relation between rival
beliefs and the winner’s post-auction profits.
Theorem 1 (Endogenous Bidder Participation) A policy of announcing (not announc-
ing) the winner’s bid leads more types to participate in the auction if π1(G(β), c) > 0 (π1(G(β), c) <
0).
This Theorem applies to many forms of post auction game. Examples include mergers,
competition for new technologies, rights to bandwidth or other resources necessary for produc-
tion. Most simply it can be viewed as bidding for the right to compete against an incumbent
monopoly. This last example provides a well known framework for conveying the intuition
behind our results. The remainder of this section will use this example to explore the de-
pendence of auction participation and post-auction profits on the inferences made from bid
announcements, G(β), by appealing to the Bertrand and Cournot duopoly games.
In these contexts the winning bidder may be thought of as an Entrant firm competing
against an Incumbent monopoly. In each case considered, the entrant knows the incumbent’s
marginal cost with certainty. However, the entrant’s marginal cost is only revealed when the
winner’s bid is announced. When their bid is not announced, the incumbent optimizes using
the expected value of the entrant’s cost given the second lowest marginal cost (obtained by
inverting the second highest bid).
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3.1 Bertrand Competition9
The specific game considered is based on Hotelling’s “linear city” model of differentiated
Bertrand competition. In that game, consumers with unitary demands are located uniformly
along a line of length one. The incumbent firm locates on the left end of the line and the
entrant locates on the right end. A consumer’s distance to either end is multiplied by a scaling
parameter t > 0, representing the lack of desirability of that service, stemming from exogenous
differentiation of the goods (a short distance represents desirability of a product).10
A consumer located at point y receives utility u0 from consuming the good and their
corresponding surplus is u0− ty− pI if they buy from the incumbent and u0− t(1− y)− pE if
they buy from the entrant. Surplus is assumed large enough (t small enough) that there exists
some central consumer that is indifferent between buying from the incumbent and entrant.
By equalizing the utilities, it follows that the central consumer is located at ey = pE−pI+t
2t .
In the Hotelling game, entrant and incumbent profits are
πE = (pE − cE)
pI − pE + t
2t
(1)
πI = (pI − cI)
pE − pI + t
2t
. (2)
Differentiating the profit functions with respect to the relevant price and solving the resulting
system of equations yields the equilibrium prices
pE =
1
3
(3t+ cI +
3
2
cE +
1
2
G(β)) (3)
pI =
1
3
(3t+G(β) + 2cI). (4)
Thus, giving the equilibrium quantities of
qE =
1
6t
(3t+ cI −
3
2
cE +
1
2
G(β)) (5)
qI =
1
6t
(3t+
3
2
cE −
1
2
G(β)− cI). (6)
9Moldovanu and Sela (2003) provide a related examination based on Bertrand Competition in Patent
Licensing.
10Linearity of “transportation costs” is assumed solely for simplicity. All calculations are the same for
quadratic costs with the exception of consumer surplus, which is less.
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The resulting equilibrium profits are
πE =
1
18t
(3t+ cI −
3
2
cE +
1
2
G(β))2 (7)
πI =
1
18t
(3t+
3
2
cE −
1
2
G(β)− cI)(3t+G(β)− cI). (8)
Note the dependence of profits on G(β), the incumbent’s expectation of the entrant’s type
based on the auctioneer’s announcement. The positive relation between incumbent beliefs and
entrant profits can be seen through the partial derivative of Eq. (7) with respect to G(β).
The relation between this derivative and pricing decisions is that if the incumbent believes
the entrant has a high marginal cost, they anticipate that the entrant will set a high price.
Bertrand logic then dictates that the incumbent will follow suit, setting a high price. But,
because the incumbent sets a high price, the entrant obtains more consumers and hence makes
more profit.
In the benchmark case, G(β) is independent of the auctioneer’s announcement and hence
equals cE. Thus, the benchmark profit function is
πE(cE, cE) =
1
18t
(3t+ cI − cE)2. (9)
Equating this profit to zero gives us the cut-off type, c∗BM = 3t + cI , that is just indifferent
between competing and not competing in the auction.
When nature does not reveal the entrant’s type and the auctioneer announces the winner’s
bid, inversion reveals the winner’s reported type, x, resulting in a payoff of
πE(x, cE) =
1
18t
(3t+ cI −
3
2
cE +
1
2
x)2. (10)
In equilibrium, bidders truthfully report their types, x = c. Setting Eq. (10) equal to zero
and imposing truthful revelation once again gives the cut-off type c∗1st = 3t+ cI .
If only the second highest bid (b(2)) is announced, inversion yields the second lowest
marginal cost (c(2)), giving an expectation of the lowest marginal cost of G(β) = E[z|z ≤
min(c∗Eng, c(2))]. The profit function in this case is
πE(E[z|z ≤ min(c∗Eng, c(2))], cE) (11)
=
1
18t
(3t+ cI −
3
2
cE +
1
2
E[z|z ≤ min(c∗Eng, c(2))])2. (12)
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A bidder with the cut-off type (c∗Eng) in this case will only win the auction if c(2) ≥ c∗Eng.
Therefore, when the cut-off bidder wins the auction, min(c∗Eng, c(2)) = c∗Eng giving the implicit
equation for the cut-of type
c∗Eng = 3t+ cI −
R c∗Eng
c F (x)dx
2F (c∗Eng)
. (13)
Clearly, c∗Eng < c∗BM in the Bertrand case, a consequence of Theorem 1 since π1(G(β), c) > 0.
In each of the three cases above (Eqs. (9), (10), and (11)), profits are negatively related
to the entrant’s marginal cost. However, only in the case where the winner’s bid is announced
(Eq. (10)) does the bidder’s choice of type at the auction, x, affect profits. This dependence
is central to the presence of the bid signalling effect. Eq. (10) yields the partial derivative
π1(x, cE) =
1
18t
(3t+ cI −
3
2
cE +
1
2
x). (14)
The sign of Eq. (14) gives the positive relation between the type reported at auction (x)
and profits. In other words, potential entrants will tend to understate their expected profits
(pretend to be of weak type) in an attempt to deceive the incumbent. The cross partial
resulting from Eq. (10) is
π12(x, cE) = −
1
12t
. (15)
Since the signs of Eqs. (14) and (15) work in opposite directions, Condition 1 may be violated.
This is explored further below in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
3.2 Cournot Competition
The specific Cournot game considered uses the normalized demand function P = 1−Q.11 The
incumbent’s marginal cost, cI , is assumed to be less than 1+c2 , guaranteeing that the winning
bidder will not supplant the incumbent as the monopolist.
11All results hold for the more general case of P = a−bQ. However, the notation becomes excessive without
adding insight.
11
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Expected profits for the two firms in the Cournot market are
πE = (1− qE − qI)qE − cEqE (16)
πI = (1−E[qE]− qI)qI − cIqI . (17)
Maximizing each firm’s profit with respect to its choice of quantity and rearranging gives
qE =
1 + cI − 32cE −
1
2
G(β)
3
(18)
qI =
1 +G(β)− 2cI
3
. (19)
The profits associated with these equilibrium quantities are
πE =
∙
1 + cI − 32cE −
1
2
G(β)
3
¸2
(20)
πI =
∙
1 + cE − 2cI
3
¸2
. (21)
As in the Bertrand environment, profits depend on G(β). The negative relation between
incumbent beliefs and entrant profits is seen through the partial derivative of Eq. (20) with
respect to G(β). The intuitive relation between this derivative and output decisions is that if
the incumbent believes the entrant has a high marginal cost, they anticipate that the entrant
will produce a relatively small quantity. Cournot logic then dictates that the incumbent will
take advantage of the lack of supply and produce a relatively large amount. Because the
incumbent produces a high level of output, the price is lowered and the entrant makes lower
profit.
In the benchmark case, G(β) = cE, as nature reveals cE after the auction and the auction-
eer’s announcement policy is irrelevant. The profit function in this case is
πE(cE, cE) =
∙
1 + cI − 2cE
3
¸2
. (22)
Equating this profit to zero gives us the cut-off type, c∗ = (1 + cI)/2, that is just indifferent
between competing and not competing in the auction.
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When a bidder announces their type as x and their bid is invertible, their payoff becomes
πE(x, cE) =
∙
1 + cI − 32cE −
1
2
x
3
¸2
. (23)
In equilibrium, bidders truthfully report their types, x = c. Setting Eq. (10) equal to zero
and imposing truthful revelation once again gives the cut-off type c∗1st = (1 + cI)/2.
If only the second highest bid (b(2)) is announced, inversion yields the second lowest mar-
ginal cost (c(2)), giving an expectation of the entrant’s marginal cost of G(β) = E[z|z <
min(c∗Eng, c(2))]. The profit function in this case is
πE(E[z|z < min(c∗Eng, c(2))], cE) (24)
=
"
1 + cI − 32cE −
1
2
E[z|z < min(c∗Eng, c(2))]
3
#2
(25)
A bidder with the cut-off type (c∗Eng) in this case will only win the auction if c(2) ≥ c∗Eng.
Therefore, when the cut-off type wins the auction, min(c∗Eng, c(2)) = c∗Eng giving the implicit
equation for the cut-of type
c∗Eng =
1 + cI
2
+
R c∗Eng
c F (s)ds
4F (c∗Eng)
. (26)
Clearly, c∗Eng > c
∗
BM in the Cournot case, a consequence of Theorem 1 since π1(G(β), c) < 0.
As in the Bertrand case, profits are negatively related to the entrant’s marginal cost in
each of the three cases above (Eqs. (22), (23), and (24)). Once again, only in the case where
the winner’s bid is announced (Eq. (23)) does the bidder’s choice of type at the auction, x,
affect profits. This dependence is central to the presence of the bid signalling effect. Eq. (23)
yields the partial derivative
π1(x, cE) =
−1
9
(1 + cI −
3
2
cE −
1
2
x). (27)
The sign of Eq. (27) gives the negative relation between the type reported at auction (x)
and profits. In other words, potential entrants will tend to overstate their expected profits
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(pretend to be of strong type) in an attempt to deceive the incumbent. The cross partial
resulting from Eq. (23) is
π12(x, cE) =
1
6
. (28)
Since the signs of Eqs. (27) and (28) work in the same direction, Condition 1 will not be
violated.
In summary, the Bertrand and Cournot models provide examples where firm types are
negatively related to profits, but depend on reports at auction in opposing fashions (see Eqs.
(14) and (27)). These examples give not only an intuitive background in which our results
can be framed, but also provide analytic solutions that will be necessary in our analysis of
post-auction welfare (Section 6).
4 Stage One: The Auction
This is the most general section in the paper in that derivation of equilibrium bid strategies is
based on the general profit function π(G(β), c). Three different auction forms are considered:
1st price, 2nd Price, and English. The first and second price formats are analyzed under
a policy of announcing the winner’s bid, while only the second highest bid is announced
following an English auction. For each auction form, the symmetric equilibrium bid functions
are derived and then compared to those resulting in the benchmark case. The benchmark
equilibrium bid functions are
b1st(c) =
R c∗BM
c π(z, z)(n− 1)[1− f(z)]n−2f(z)dz
[1− F (c)]n−1 (29)
b2nd(c) = π(c, c) (30)
bEng(c) = π(c, c). (31)
The first price bid function simply requires that an individual’s bid equal the expected profit
of the next most competitive bidder, given that the individual has the best type. The second
price and English auction bid functions represent the famed Vickrey (1961) result concerning
the dominance of bidding one’s valuation.
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4.1 First price auctions (with winning bid announced)
Given that its opponents are all using the strictly increasing differentiable bid function b(c),
a firm’s expected payoff from entering a first price auction is
Π(x, c) = [π(x, c)− b(x)] [1− F (x)]n−1. (32)
The first term is simply the firm’s surplus if it wins the auction with a report of x. The second
term is the probability that the report wins the auction.
Theorem 2 The symmetric equilibrium bid function in a first price auction is given by
b1st(c) =
R c∗1st
c
h
π(y, y)− π1(y, y) [1−F (y)](n−1)f(y)
i
(n− 1)[1− F (y)]n−2f(y)dy
[1− F (c)]n−1 (33)
if Condition 1 holds.
Examination of Eq. (33) reveals that the benchmark model is nested in this model. That
is, when nature reveals the winner’s type, π1(c, c) = 0, the fact that c∗1st = c∗BM results in
Eq. (29). If signalling is possible, π1(c, c) < 0 leads to bids above the benchmark level and
π1(c, c) > 0 leads to bids below the benchmark level. The tendency to lower bids below
expected profit is an attempt to convince the incumbent that a worse type was drawn than
actually was. It is this tendency that necessitates Condition 1. The condition ensures that
the tendency is not so strong as to produce degenerately low bids (e.g. zero) that result
in non-monotonically increasing bid functions. If Condition 1 is violated, non-existence of a
separating equilibrium follows.
4.2 Second price auctions (with winning bid announced)
This section considers a second price auction where the winner’s bid is announced. The Theo-
rem of Revenue Equivalent Classes tells us that the expected revenue generated in this setting
will equal that generated by the first price auction just discussed. However, the properties
of the equilibrium bid function provide interesting intuition and a meaningful comparison to
established results, particularly in the special case where post-auction profits are negatively
related to rival beliefs.
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A bidder acting as type x, whose opponents are using the strictly increasing bid function
b(c) has expected payoff entering a second price auction of:
Π2nd(x, c) = π(x, c) (1− F (x))n−1 (34)
−
Z c∗2nd
x
b(y)(n− 1) (1− F (y))n−2 f(y)dy.
The first term is the second stage profit times the probability of winning with a report of x.
The second term is the expected payment if at least one other bidder has marginal cost below
c∗2nd, which equals c
∗
BM because the winning bid is announced. If no other bidder has marginal
cost below c∗2nd, the bidder wins and pays zero in the absence of a reserve price.
Theorem 3 The symmetric equilibrium bid function in a second price auction is given by
b2nd(c) = π(c, c)−
π1(c, c) (1− F (c))
(n− 1)f(c) . (35)
if Condition 1 holds.
As in the first price equilibrium, Eq. (35) nests the benchmark bid function. That is,
when π1(c, c) = 0, Eq. (30) results. If π1(c, c) < 0, bids are above the benchmark level and if
π1(c, c) > 0, bids are below the benchmark level. The case where is π1(c, c) < 0 is interesting
since bids are actually above the value obtained from winning the auction, π(c, c). The upside
to this strategy is the deception imparted on the incumbent. The downside is running the
risk that the price paid will fall between profit and the inflated bid, generating a loss. When
there are relatively few bidders, an individual is willing to take the risk of bidding more than
their expected profit. However, as the number of opponents grows, the downside becomes
more likely, leading to lower bids. Bids approach post-auction profits, π(c, c), as the number
of bidders approaches infinity.12
The negative relation between bids and number of bidders leads to an interesting policy
implication for auctioneers choosing between first and second price auctions. A common
method of disrupting collusive rings in procurements is to invite a subset of the pool of
12Although the underlying intuition is different, this prediction is similar to Rosenthal (1980) where a greater
number of sellers leads to a higher price.
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potential bidders.13 Consider a seller interested in inviting a subset of the best type firms
without letting them know the selection criterion (i.e. beliefs about opponents types went
unchanged, but beliefs concerning number of opponents did change). He would expect higher
revenue from a second price auction than if he invited all bidders, and lower revenue if he used
a first price auction since the number of bidders is small and bids are deceasing (increasing)
in the number of bidders in second (first) price auctions.
Next, consider an the auctioneer that invites the top bidders, but those bidders recognized
that only the top bidders had been invited (i.e. changing a bidder’s beliefs about his opponents’
distribution over types). This auctioneer would do better to use a first price auction as the
downside of the second price auction is more likely and thus second price bids will tend
to be lower. Since bidders are commonly aware of who their closest competitors are, it is
our conjecture that it is more likely that firms will recognize when the top bidders have
been invited. The anti-collusive strategy explains why subsets of bidders are invited and our
conjecture helps explain why first price auctions are commonly used in such instances.14
4.3 English auctions (with price paid announced)
Firms participating in an English auction must choose a level at which they will drop-out of
the bidding. Bidding stops when one firm remains and the current price is paid.15 Since the
winner’s drop-out level is never reached, it is not observed and their type cannot be obtained
through inversion. Hence, signalling is not possible. However, there is uncertainty regarding
their type in the second stage game and thus second stage payoffs differ from cases where their
type is known. In addition, the inability to signal alleviates the problems with non-existence
found in the case where post-auction profits are positively related to rival beliefs.
The equilibrium drop-out rule is obtained by determining the level of bidding at which
a firm expects zero profit. Using a second price auction as a proxy, this is obtained by
maximizing a firm’s expected profit given that their opponents are using the strictly increasing
13Those interested in collusion in auctions are referred to Graham and Marshall (1987).
14Engelbrecht-Wiggans, and Kahn (1991), Rothkopf and Harstad (1995), and Rothkopf et al. (1990) for
other explanations.
15This form of the English auction has been referred to as a “button” model of the English auction. It is
decisively different than the English auction considered by Goeree (2003) and Avery (1998) where a bidder is
allowed to keep bidding, even after all other competition has dropped out.
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drop-out rule, b(c). A firm’s expected payoff is
Ec(2)
£
Π(E[y|y ≤ min(c(2), c∗Eng)], c)
¤
(36)
= π(E[z|z ≤ c∗Eng], c)
¡
1− F (c∗Eng)
¢n−1
+
Z c∗Eng
x
[π(E[z|z ≤ y, c])− b(y)] (n− 1) (1− F (y))n−2 f(y)dy.
The first term is the firm’s expected payoff if no other firms participate in the auction. The
second term is the firm’s expected profit over possible values of the lowest opponents’ type,
given that the opponent competes in the auction.
Theorem 4 The symmetric equilibrium bid function in an English auction is given by
bEng(c) = π(E[z|z ≤ c], c). (37)
Although not as immediate as in the preceding auctions, this equilibrium also nests the
benchmark equilibrium, in a different manner however. Since reports do not affect profits,
the sign of π1(c, c) is immaterial. The nesting lies in the nature of the announcement in the
benchmark model. When nature reveals the winner’s type, E[z|z < c] simply degenerates to
c and Eq. (31) results.
In this section we have derived the symmetric equilibrium bid functions for three different
auction formats: first price, second price, and English. Each of the bid functions nest those
found in the independent private values paradigm, but also account for the endogenization
of valuations caused by the presence of a post-auction market. It should not be surprising
that deviations from IPV bid functions leads to a deviation from revenue equivalence. The
following section examines the how the revenue generating properties of the various auctions
are affected by post-auction market concerns.
5 Expected Revenue and Welfare
This section examines the impact of the auctioneer’s announcement on all parties involved.
From the auctioneer’s perspective, we examine both revenue generating and efficiency prop-
erties of the different auctions. All of the auctions examined are allocatively efficient in that
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the firm with the best type wins the auction. However, announcing the winner’s bid generates
a game of complete information in the post-auction market whereas, a game of incomplete
information results when the winner’s bid is not announced. These informational differences
lead to varied expectations of consumer and producer surpluses.
The signalling and participation effects established in the previous sections have opposite
impacts on the revenue generating properties of the various auctions. The participation effect
leads to relatively more (less) competition when post-auction profits are positively (negatively)
related to rival beliefs and the winner’s bid is announced and, hence; tends to increase (de-
crease) revenues. Signalling has the opposite effect, it leads to less (more) aggressive bidding
when post-auction profits and rival beliefs are positively (negatively) related and the winner’s
bid is announce and, hence; tends to decrease (increase) revenues. Unfortunately, the net of
these effects cannot be generalized. However, the conclusion is clear, the dominance of certain
auctions over others found when only the signaling effect is considered is at least tempered
(and can be overturned) by the participation effect. The following theorem assesses the im-
pacts of the signalling and participation effects on auction revenues relative to the benchmark
case.
Theorem 5 The benchmark model over- (under-) predicts the level of bids for a given type
and hence over- (under-) estimates the expected revenues generated by the auction when
π1(G(β), c) > 0 (π1(G(β), c) < 0), regardless of the announcement policy.
The lack of a general revenue comparison based on the various announcement policies
is best seen graphically. Figures 1 and 2 show representative bid functions for the second
price and English auctions for the cases of π1(G(β), c) > 0 and π1(G(β), c) < 0 respectively.16
RegionA in Figure 1 (Figure 2) represents the fact that low types tend to bid more aggressively
in the English (first price) auctions when π1(G(β), c) > 0 (π1(G(β), c) < 0). The vertical
intercepts are obtained by evaluating each bid function at c. A bidder with that type bids the
16We choose to compare English and second price auctions here since expectations of revenue are taken over
the distribution of the second lowest order statistic for each.
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following in the three situations:
bBM = π(c, c) (38)
b2nd = π(c, c)−
π1(c, c)
(n− 1)f(c) (39)
bEng = π(c, c) (40)
Eq. (39) is obtained using Eq. (30) and recognizing that F (c) = 0. Eq. (40) results from
Eq. (31) and the fact that E[w|w ≤ c] = c. The implication is that when π1 > 0 the second
price bid function has a lower vertical intercept than the benchmark and English auction bid
functions (which have the same intercept). When π1 < 0, the vertical intercept of second
price bid function is above that of the benchmark and English bid functions. These properties
provide insight into the success of the PCS auctions. As the post-auction market for mobile
telecommunications is best characterized by pricing competition (π1 > 0), and several highly
competitive firms participated in the auction, the prices paid were determined in region A of
Figure 1. Hence, the decision to use English auctions resulted in systematically higher bids
than auctions where the bidder’s type could be inferred.
The difference in the horizontal intercepts of the bid functions represents the endoge-
nous participation effect and highlights the lack of a general revenue comparison. Both the
benchmark and second price auctions have the same intercept as the information available to
post-auction market competitors is the same. In Figure 1 (Figure 2), the intercept for the
English auction is lower (higher) than that in the other auctions. Combining the properties of
the vertical and horizontal intercepts provides the intuition behind Theorem 5. When π1 < 0
(π1 > 0), the benchmark case has both the lowest (highest) vertical and horizontal intercepts
and hence predicts lower (higher) expected revenues than the other auctions. The intercepts
also provide insight into the lack of a general revenue comparison of the second price and
English auctions. As bid functions are monotonic in each auction, one with a higher vertical
intercept, the other with a higher horizontal intercept, one does not decisively dominate the
other.
We now turn to the specific cases of Bertrand and Cournot competition in the post-auction
market to examine the welfare effects of the various announcement policies.
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5.1 Bertrand Competition
Predictions concerning market prices and surplus hinge on two consequences of the announce-
ment policies. First, announcing versus not announcing the winner’s bid leads to distinctly
different post-auction games. When the bid is announced, the game is one of complete in-
formation. Alternatively, not announcing the winner’s bid produces a game of incomplete
information. Second, more types tend to participate when the winner’s bid is going to be
announced. The following theorem assesses the impact of these two consequences.
Theorem 6 The Incumbent’s expected price and the average market price are lower in the
differentiated Bertrand market when the winner’s bid is announced than when it is not.
The intuition behind the theorem is as follows. The nature of the Bertrand model produces
a linear relation between entrant type and prices. Hence, prices are, on average, the same
regardless of the announcement policy whenever the auction produces an entrant. However,
the fact that more types participate when the winner’s bid is announced makes it more likely
that the auction will produce a competitor for the incumbent monopoly. Because it is less
likely that the incumbent retains their monopoly power, their price tends to be lower following
an announcement of the winner’s bid as are average market prices. Also notice that there is
no statement regarding the entrant’s price. Whenever an entrant emerges as a result of the
auction, their expected price is the same under each policy. However, in the region above c∗Eng
but below c∗1st, there is no entrant price if an English auction were held and thus comparisons
are meaningless.
The conflicting participation and signalling effects lead to an indeterminate ranking of
surpluses. The following theorem addresses surplus comparisons in the case where a monopoly
result is not possible.17
Theorem 7 Differentiated Bertrand competition subsequent to a first price auction leads to
lower expected consumer surplus and incumbent profits and higher expected entrant profits than
subsequent to an English auction, when there is no possibility of monopoly.
17Once again, the FCC spectrum auctions provide an excellent example of this situation. Most economists
agreed that there would certainly be an entrant in every market. The Mexican spectrum auction provides
an example where such an assumption is inappropriate. One wavelength actually went unsold, potentially
indicating that no one was below the cut-off type (see Chakraborty (2002) for a discussion).
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The above theorem provides insight into the preferences of the parties involved. Consumers
in general prefer English auctions to first price auctions. However, these preferences are split
between those buying from the incumbent and those buying from the entrant. Consumers
buying from the incumbent have higher expected surplus following a first price auction while
those buying from the entrant prefer an English auction. The incumbent prefers an English
auction for two reasons. First, they have higher expected profit when facing an entrant and
second, there is a greater chance that they will retain their monopoly position. Entrants have
opposite preferences. They prefer first price auctions because they expected higher profits
due to the certainty introduced by the announcement, and they are more likely to enter the
post-auction market.
5.2 Cournot Competition
Predictions concerning production levels depend on informational structure of the Cournot
game resulting from the announcement policy. The following theorem assesses the impact of
participation decisions and that informational structure.
Theorem 8 Expected entrant output, qE, is higher following first price auctions than they are
following English auctions. Expected incumbent output, qI, and total production, qE + qI, are
lower following first price auctions than following English auctions.
Unlike the corresponding theorem for the Bertrand market (Theorem 6), the entrant’s decision
is included in Theorem 8. In Bertrand competition, a definitive conclusion regarding the
entrant’s price required specifying the price charged by the entrant when, in fact, they never
entered the market (i.e. a monopoly situation). The Cournot case is more straight forward.
When an entrant does not enter the market, their output is clearly zero.
Expected quantities are linear in the entrant’s type, as were expected prices in the Bertrand
case. Therefore, the quantity will be the same under each announcement policy as long as the
incumbent does not retain its monopoly power. Clearly this leads to greater entrant output
since more types participate in post-auction competition and there is less chance of reversion
to a monopolistic market. However, a higher likelihood of post-auction competition actually
leads to less incumbent output, on average. There is also an opposite effect on incumbent
output caused by the fact that they will face, on average, more high cost entrants and thus
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will tend to produce more. In fact, this latter effect dominates leading to the conclusion that
the incumbent produces more after an English auction. The totality of these effects results in
less expected market output following an English auction. Finally, higher quantities clearly
lead to lower prices in this market.
Another interesting aspect of this market is that following an announcement of the winner’s
bid, as the entrant’s marginal cost approaches the highest possible type (c∗1st), the incumbent’s
output approaches the monopoly output. However, following an English auction, as the
entrant’s marginal cost approaches c∗Eng, the incumbent’s output approaches a level strictly
less than the monopoly output. Or, there is a discontinuity in the incumbent’s output at c∗Eng.
The problem is that the incumbent tends to over-estimate the strength of weak type entrants
in the game of incomplete information. Thus, even when entrant is of the worst possible type
and produces zero output, the incumbent still does not produce the monopoly output because
they expected the entrant to provide a positive level of output. Therefore, when a high type
entrant emerges from the auction, the market is actually less efficient under competition than
it would be under a monopoly.
As in the Bertrand case, general comparisons are not possible because of the implicit defin-
ition of cut-off types. The following theorem assesses the surplus impacts of the announcement
policies in a situation where monopoly is impossible.
Theorem 9 When a monopoly outcome is not possible, Cournot competition subsequent to a
first price auction leads to higher expected consumer surplus and entrant profit than after an
English auction. Expected incumbent profits are independent of the auction form.
In the end, the four different parties involved (auctioneer, consumers, entrant, and incumbent)
have different preferences over the auction form employed, likely leading to varied lobbying
efforts. Unlike the Bertrand case, consumers in general prefer that a first price auction be
held. The incumbent firm is indifferent between auction forms in situations where they face an
entrant. However, they are more likely to retain their monopoly power after a first price auc-
tion and hence prefer it to an English auction. Finally, potential entrants face an interesting
dilemma in the case of Cournot competition. They expect higher profit in the post-auction
market following a first price auction. However, at the auction, they must bid more aggres-
sively in a first price auction to signal that they are of strong type and thus, pay more on
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average to enter the market.
6 Conclusion
It has been shown that when an auction is held for the right to engage in post-auction com-
petition, the auctioneer can affect auction revenues and efficiency through the announcement
of bids. In the separating equilibrium where a bid is a monotonic function of the bidder’s
type, announcing the winner’s bid is tantamount to announcing their type. Realizing that
their type can be inferred from their bid under such a policy, bidders attempt to manipulate
their bids in an attempt to signal false information regarding their type to their post-auction
rivals. Thus, in terms of mechanism design, auctioneer’s have an additional dimension (an-
nouncement choice) that they can consider when maximizing expected auction revenues.
When post-auction profits are inversely related to rival beliefs, the signalling effect leads
to more aggressive bidding in an effort to signal a strong type. In this case, the auctioneer
can exploit the signalling effect by announcing the winner’s bid, thereby enhancing revenues.
However, the revenue enhancing effects of such a policy are tempered as fewer firms choose to
participate in that auction. Alternatively, when post-auction profits are positively related to
rival beliefs, the signalling and participation effects are reversed. Bids are less aggressive as
bidders attempt to signal a relatively poor type. In this case, the auctioneer prefers to withhold
the winner’s bid to nullify the signalling effect, but once again faces the counteracting effect
that fewer bidders will participate than if the winner’s bid were announced.
At this point, the two-stage nature of our model keeps us from making general statements
regarding the welfare effects brought about by different announcement policies. However,
for the Cournot and Bertrand models considered in this paper, we establish the impact that
announcing/not announcing the winner’s bid has on expected prices and output, as well as,
consumer and producer surplus.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Let c∗1st denote the cut-off type when the winner’s bid is announced and c∗Eng denote the cut-off
type when only the second highest bid is announced. Consider the case where π1(G(β), c) < 0.
If the winner’s bid is announced, G(β) = c, in equilibrium. By definition, π(c∗1st, c∗1st) = 0.
When the winner’s bid is not announced, G(β) = E(x|x < c). Now assume that c∗Eng =
c∗1st. It follows that π(E(x|x < c∗1st), c∗1st) = 0. However, since π1(G(β), c) < 0, π(E(x|x <
c∗1st), c∗1st) > π(c∗1st, c∗1st) and the assumption that c∗Eng = c
∗
1st is contradicted. Finally, since
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π(E(x|x < c∗1st), c∗1st) > π(c∗1st, c∗1st), a bidder with type epsilon above c∗1st will remain active
in the English auction indicating that c∗Eng > c
∗
1stwhich are clearly greater than zero since
π1(G(β), c) < 0 and E(x|x < c) < c. Hence, bidders with types epsilon above the first price
cut-off type will earn positive profit in the English auction and c∗Eng > c∗1st. The argument for
π1(G(β), c) > 0 yields the opposite ranking by examining the relevant payoffs at c∗Eng.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Differentiating Eq.(32) with respect to x gives the following first order condition
[π1(x, c)− b0(x)] [1− F (x)]n−1 − [π(x, c)− b(x)] (n− 1)[1− F (x)]n−2f(x) = 0. (A1)
Imposing symmetry gives
[π1(c, c)− b0(c)] [1− F (c)]n−1 − [π(c, c)− b(c)] (n− 1)[1− F (c)]n−2f(c) = 0. (A2)
Differentiating both sides of Eq.(33) with respect to c gives Eq.(A2).
Using Eq.(A2) to obtain b0(x) and substituting b0(x) into the derivative of Π (the left hand
side of Eq. (A1) gives
[π1(x, c)− π1(x, x)] [1− F (x)] + [π(x, x)− π(x, c)] (n− 1)f(x). (A3)
When π12(c, c) > 0, both terms in Eq.(A3) work in the same direction and are positive
(negative) for x < c (x > c), indicating that the proposed bid function is the globally optimal
response. When π12(c, c) > 0, the two terms in Eq.(A3) work in opposite directions indicating
a possible non-existence of a separating equilibrium. However, Condition 1 ensures that
Eq.(A3) is positive (negative) for x < c (x > c), indicating that the proposed bid function is
the globally optimal response in this case as well. Finally, since Eq.(33) satisfies the boundary
condition that the worst possible bidder (type c∗1st) earns zero profit in equilibrium, the proof
is complete.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Differentiating Eq.(34) gives the following first order condition
π1(x, c)[1− F (x)]n−1 − [π(x, c)− b(x)] (n− 1)[1− F (x)]n−2f(x) = 0. (A4)
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Imposing symmetry and solving for b(c) gives Eq.(35).
Substituting the equilibrium bid function b(x) into the derivative of Π (the left hand side
of Eq.(A4) gives
[π1(x, c)− π1(x, x)] [1− F (x)] + [π(x, x)− π(x, c)] (n− 1)f(x). (A5)
As in the previous proof, both terms in Eq.(A5) work in the same direction when π12(c, c) > 0
and are positive (negative) for x < c (x > c), indicating that the proposed bid function
is the globally optimal response. When π12(c, c) > 0, the two terms in Eq. (A3) work
in opposite directions indicating a possible non-existence of a separating equilibrium. Once
again, Condition 1 ensures that Eq. (A3) is positive (negative) for x < c (x > c), indicating
that the proposed bid function is the globally optimal response in this case as well. Finally,
since Eq. (35) satisfies the boundary condition that the worst possible bidder (type c∗2nd) earns
zero profit in equilibrium, the proof is complete.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
The first order condition obtained from maximizing Eq.(36) with respect to x is
− [π(E[z|z ≤ x], c)− b(x)] (n− 1) (1− F (x))n−2 f(x) = 0. (A6)
Imposing symmetry yields the equilibrium bid function b(c) = π(E[z|z ≤ c], c). Substituting
b(x) = π(E[z|z ≤ x], x) into the left hand side of Eq.(A6) shows the first derivative of Π is,
− [π(E[z|z ≤ x], c)− π(E[z|z ≤ x], x)] (n− 1) (1− F (x))n−2 f(x). (A7)
But, since π is decreasing in its second argument, Eq.(A7) is positive for x < c and negative
for x > c, indicating that the proposed bid function is the globally optimal response. Finally,
since Eq.(37) satisfies the boundary condition that the worst possible bidder (type c∗Eng) earns
zero profit in equilibrium, the proof is complete.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
We prove the case where π1(G(β), c) > 0. The truth of the opposite case follows easily.
28
KATZMAN & RHODES-KROPF: The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions
AERB Special Issue I http://berkeleymath.com/BerkeleyJournal.aspx 80
When π1(G(β), c) > 0, E[x|x ≤ c] ≤ c, implying that π(c, c) ≥ π(E[x|x ≤ c], c),∀c ∈
[c, c∗Eng]. Since, c∗BM > c∗Eng, expected revenue in the English auction is less than predicted by
the benchmark model.
Second price bids equal π(c, c) − π1(c,c)(1−F (c))
(n−1)f(c) . Since π1(G(β), c) > 0, this is clearly less
than the benchmark bid of π(c, c). Finally, c∗BM = c
∗
2nd indicating that benchmark bids are
higher than second price bids for all c ∈ [c, c∗2nd].
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
The proofs regarding the incumbent’s price and average price are based on which of the
following three ranges the lowest entrant marginal cost draw lies: [c, c∗Eng], [c
∗
Eng, c
∗
1st], or
[c∗1st, c]. In addition, we will use the fact that the expectation of the entrant’s marginal cost
cE, equals the expectation of the entrant’s marginal cost, given that it is below the second
lowest marginal cost of all bidders (i.e. the information released after the English auction).
Or, E[cE] = E[E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]] = E[E[
R y
c wf(w)dw/F (y)]].
Incumbent’s Price: In the range [c, c∗Eng], an entrant competes in the post-auction market,
regardless of the announcement policy. The expected incumbent price is E[pI ] = E[1/3(3t+
2cI + G(β)] where the expectation is taken over G(β). Following the first price auction
G(β) = cE whereas after the English auction G(β) = E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)] where the expectation
is taken over possible values of the second highest bidder’s type c(2) ∈ [c, c∗Eng]. Since E[pI ]
is linear in G(β) and the expectation of G(β) equals cE in the English auction, the expected
price will be the same in this range of types. For potential types in the range [c∗Eng, c
∗
1st], the
expected price after the first price auction is still E[1/3(3t+ 2cI +G(β)], however; the price
following the English auction is simply the monopoly price pm = cI − t which is clearly higher
than the expected following the first price auction. Finally, once all types are above c∗1st, the
monopoly price persists in both situations and the expectation is the same over the range
[c∗1st, c]. Since the expected price is the same in the upper and lower ranges, but higher in the
intermediate range when the winner’s bid is not announced, the expected incumbent price is
lower under a policy of announcing the winner’s bid.
Average Price: The average price in the market over the range [c, c∗Eng] is PAvg = 1/6[6t+
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3cI+3cE] following an announcement of the winner’s bid. An announcement of only the second
highest bid produces an average price of 1/6[6t+3cI+3/2cE+3/2E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]]. Once again,
these expectations are linear in cE and E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)] indicating that the expected average
price is the same over this range. In the range [c∗Eng, c
∗
1st], both the entrant an incumbent
prices following a first price auction are below the monopoly price of pm = cI − t that arises
after the English auction and thus the average price is lower in the former situation. Finally,
both markets exist under the monopoly price and thus have the same expectation in the range
[c∗1st, c]. Since the expected price is the same in the upper and lower ranges, but higher in
the intermediate range when the winner’s bid is not announced, the expected average price is
lower under a policy of announcing the winner’s bid.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 7
Each part is based on convexity/concavity of the relevant functions.
Consumer Surplus: Consumers buying from the entrant have surplus of
Z 1
?y
[u0 − t(1− y)− pE]dy
= (u0 − pE)(pI − pE + t)/2t− (pI − pE + t)2/8t
= (u0 − 1/3(3t+ cI + 3/2cE + 1/2G(β)))(3t+ 1/2G(β) + cI − 3/2cE)/6t
−1/9(3t+ 1/2G(β) + cI − 3/2cE)2/8t.
The second derivative, taken twice with respect to the incumbent’s belief is negative. Hence,
concavity dictates that consumers buying from the entrant have higher expected surplus fol-
lowing an English auction than following a first price auction.
Consumers buying from the incumbent have expected surplus of
Z ?y
0
[u0 − ty − pI ]dy
= (u0 − pI)(pE − pI + t)/2t− (pE − pI + t)2/8t
= (u0 − 1/3(3t+G(β) + 2cI))(3t− 1/2G(β)− cI + 3/2cE)/6t
−1/9(3t− 1/2G(β)− cI + 3/2cE)2/8t.
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The second derivative, taken twice with respect to the incumbent’s belief, is positive. Hence,
convexity dictates that consumers buying from the incumbent have higher expected surplus
following a first price auction than an English auction.
Finally, summing the expected surplus of both types of consumers yields a second deriva-
tive, taken twice with respect to the incumbent’s beliefs, of −1/144t < 0. Hence, consumers
on average receive higher expected surplus following an English auction than following a first
price auction.
Entrant Profit : Expected entrant profit in the post-auction market is ExEy[πE] where x
is the lowest of the potential entrants’ marginal cost draws, y is the second lowest, and πE is
given by Eq. (7). The second derivative of πE with respect to the incumbent’s belief, is greater
than zero. Hence, the convexity of the profit function in the incumbent’s belief dictates that
expected entrant profits are higher following a first price auction than following an English
auction.
Incumbent Profit: Expected incumbent profit in the post-auction market is ExEy[πI ] where
x is the lowest of the potential entrants’ marginal cost draws, y is the second lowest, and πI
is given by Eq. (8). The second derivative of πI with respect to the incumbent’s belief is less
than zero. Hence, the concavity of incumbent profits indicates that expected incumbent profit
is greater following an English auction than following a first price auction.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 8
As in the proof of Theorem 6, we use the fact that the expectation of the entrant’s marginal
cost cE, equals the expectation of the entrant’s marginal cost, given that it is below the second
lowest marginal cost of all bidders (i.e. the information released after the English auction).
Or, E[cE] = E[E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]] = E[E[
R y
c wf(w)dw/F (y)]]. The relevant ranges of bidder
types in the Cournot setting are [c, c∗1st], [c∗1st, c∗Eng], or [c
∗
Eng, c].
Entrant’s Quantity: When both types of announcement policy produce an entrant firm, the
expected entrant quantity following an announcement of the winner’s bid is E[qE] = E[1/3(1+
cI − 2cE]. Following the announcement of only the second highest bid, the expected entrant
quantity is 1/3(1+cI−3/2cE−1/2E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]). Since both expectations are linear in cE and
E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)], the expected quantities are the same. In the range [c∗1st, c∗Eng], an entrant firm
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is only present in the market following the English auction. The other market is monopolistic
and entrant quantity is therefore zero. Finally, both situations produce a monopoly and zero
entrant output in the range [c∗Eng, c]. Since the entrant produces the same expected quantity in
the upper and lower ranges, and they continue to produce in the intermediate range following
the English auction, expected entrant production is higher following the English auction.
Incumbent’s Quantity: In the range [c, c∗1st], the expected incumbent’s quantity following
an announcement of the winner’s bid is E[1/3(1− 2cI + cE)]. Following the English auction,
it is E[1/3(1 − 2cI + E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)])]. Once again, the fact that these two expectations are
linear in cE and E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]] indicates that the expected incumbent quantity is the same in
this range. In the range [c∗1st, c∗Eng], the incumbent still has competition following an English
auction, but becomes a monopoly following a first price auction. The monopoly produces
(1− cI)/2 which is strictly more than the incumbent produces following a first price auction.
Finally, the incumbent produces the same monopoly output in the range [c∗Eng, c]. Since the
incumbent’s expected output is the same in the upper and lower ranges and they supply more
following an announcement of the winner’s bid in the intermediate range, expected incumbent
output is less following an English auction.
Total Quantity: In the range [c, c∗1st], the expected total output in the market following
an announcement of the winner’s bid is the expectation of the sum of the entrant and in-
cumbent output, E[1/3(2 − cI − cE)]. Following an English auction, expected total output
is E[1/3(2 − cI − 3/2cE + 1/2E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]]. Since each of the expectations is linear in cE
and E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)], they are equal. Over the range [c∗1st, c∗Eng], it has been established that
the entrant produces more and the incumbent produces less following the English auction.
The question is whether or not the sum is greater or less than the monopoly output following
the announcement of the winner’s bid. The monopoly output is 1−cI
2
. The expected total
output after the English auction is E[1/3(2−cI−3/2cE+1/2E[cE|cE ≤ c(2)]] which is strictly
less than E[1/3(2− cI − 2cE)] since the expectation is taken over the entire range of possible
types. Hence , the difference between total output in the market and the monopoly output is
at least (1+ cI − 2cE)/6. This is clearly negative in the relevant range since the lowest cE can
be is c∗1st =
1+cI
2
. Finally, both policies result in the monopoly output in the [c∗Eng, c] range.
Since the total output is the same in the upper and lower ranges and strictly less following the
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English auction in the intermediate range, expected total output is less following an English
auction.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 9
Each part is based on the convexity/concavity of the relevant functions.
Consumer Surplus: Expected consumer surplus is ExEy[Q2] where x is the lowest of the
potential entrants’ marginal cost draws, y is the second lowest, andQ = (2−cI− 32x+
1
2
G(β))/3
is the sum of Eqs. (18) and (19). The second derivative taken twice with respect to the
incumbent’s belief is positive. Hence, convexity dictates that expected consumer surplus is
higher following a first price auction than following an English auction.
Entrant Profit : Expected entrant profit in the post-auction market is ExEy[πE] where x
is the lowest of the potential entrants’ marginal cost draws, y is the second lowest, and πE
is given by Eq. (20). The second derivative of πE, taken twice with respect to incumbent
beliefs is 1/6 > 0 indicating the convexity of entrant profits in the direction of interest. Hence,
expected entrant profits are higher following a first price auction than following an English
auction.
Incumbent Profit: Expected incumbent profit in the post-auction market is ExEy[πI ] where
x is the lowest of the potential entrants’ marginal cost draws, y is the second lowest, and πI
is given by Eq. (21). Since expected incumbent output does not depend on the incumbent’s
beliefs, the incumbent expects the same level of profit independent of the auction form used.
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Figure 1: π1(G(β), c) > 0
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Figure 2: π1(G(β), c) < 0
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